

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 070503
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY PM/ISP:JHAWES:RG

APPROVED BY PM:LHGELB

PM - MR. GOMPERT

EUR - MR. VEST

NSC - MR. BARTHOLOMEW

OSD/ISA - MR. SLOCOMBE

S/S :RCASTRODALE

-----053514 182302Z /66

O 182244Z MAR 78 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN NIACT IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USNATO NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 070503

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MNUC

SUBJECT: ERW NAC CONSULTATIONS

1. FOR BONN: PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
SECRETARY VANCE TO FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER:

BEGIN TEXT: DEAR HANS DIETRICH: I KNOW YOU SHARE MY
VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONSULTATIONS IN BRUSSELS
MONDAY ON THE ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPON. IT IS ESSENTIAL
THAT THE US, THE FRG AND THE UK DEMONSTRATE OUR UNITED
DESIRE FOR A SWIFT AND CLEAR OUTCOME TO THIS QUESTION,

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WHICH WILL REFLECT STRONG ALLIANCE COHESION AND RESOLVE.
AMBASSADOR BENNETT WILL BE WORKING FOR THE GREATEST
POSSIBLE HARMONY OF VIEWS IN BRUSSELS, AND I WOULD HOPE
THAT YOU COULD SIMILARLY INSTRUCT AMBASSADOR PAULS, SO
THAT WE COULD EMERGE FROM THE MONDAY MEETING WITH AN
ALLIANCE CONSENSUS WHICH WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE FINAL
POSITIVE ACTION LATER IN THE WEEK. SINCERELY,

CYRUS VANCE END TEXT.

2. IN DELIVERING LETTER, AMBASSADOR SHOULD INDICATE THAT WE BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT US, UK AND FRG ALL URGE AT THE NAC THE NEED TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE RAPIDLY, AND THAT ALL THREE COUNTRIES SUPPORT ERW PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT IF ARMS CONTROL IS UNSUCCESSFUL. WE UNDERSTAND FRG DESIRE TO EXPLAIN ITS VIEWS ON THE TANK OPTION, AND TO HAVE THESE THOROUGHLY CONSIDERED; AT THE SAME TIME, WE WOULD HOPE FRG WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE CLEAR IN THE NAC THAT, IN THE INTEREST OF SECURING RAPID MOVEMENT AND ALLIANCE UNITY, FRG WOULD BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT A CONSENSUS IF IT SHOULD DEVELOP ALONG LINES OF US PROPOSAL FOR ERW-SS/20 LINKAGE. FINALLY, THE FRG MIGHT WANT TO NOTE THAT AN OFFER TO TRADE ERW FOR THE SS-20 WOULD NOT PRECLUDE CONSIDERATION OF A SOVIET COUNTER-OFFER INVOLVING TANKS OUTSIDE MBFR, SHOULD THE SOVIETS CONCLUSIVELY REJECT ER/20 AND MAKE A SERIOUS COUNTER-OFFER. YOU SHOULD ALSO INDICATE THAT IT IS NOT OUR INTENTION TO PUT TEXTS OF A SUMMING-UP STATEMENT ON THE TABLE FOR DISCUSSION ON MONDAY. RATHER, WE WOULD ANTICIPATE THAT PETRIGNANI WOULD CONCLUDE MONDAY MEETING BY NOTING ESSENTIAL POINTS OF AGREEMENT IF THAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. AS TO TEXT OF GERMAN DRAFT, YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT WE SEE NO SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES, APART FROM BRACKETED LANGUAGE. WE HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THE GERMAN SECRET

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FORMULATION WHICH HAS THE ALLIANCE "TAKE NOTE OF" THE US PRODUCTION DECISION, AND ARE AMENDING OUR TEXT ACCORDINGLY.

3. FOR USNATO: AMBASSADOR SHOULD CONTACT PAULS AND MAKE POINTS TO HIM ALONG LINES PARAS 1 AND 2. AMBASSADOR SHOULD ALSO CONTACT PETRIGNANI AND PRESENT COPY OF US/UK DRAFT SUMMING UP STATEMENT, AS AN INDICATION OF THE POINTS THAT THE US BELIEVES SHOULD BE COVERED IN HIS STATEMENT AT THE END OF THE MONDAY NAC. YOU SHOULD AMEND THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF THE STATEMENT TO REPLACE "SUPPORT" FOR PRODUCTION DECISION WITH "TAKE NOTE OF". AMBASSADOR SHOULD INDICATE TO PETRIGNANI THAT, WHILE WE WOULD NOT EXPECT HIM TO READ OUT OUR STATEMENT AT THE MONDAY SESSION, WE THINK IT ESSENTIAL THAT HE MAKE CLEAR, IN CONCLUDING THAT MEETING, ALL OF THE POINTS WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE IN A SUMMING UP STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON WEDNESDAY. TO THAT END, YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT FOLLOWING ARE ESSENTIAL POINTS WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE EVIDENT ON MONDAY:

--THE ALLIES HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF THE US DECISION TO PRO-

DUCE ERW LOOKING TO DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE IN 18-24 MONTHS;

--THEY AGREE WITH THE US OFFER TO FOREGO DEPLOYMENT OF ERW IF THE SOVIET UNION AGREES TO FOREGO DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-20; SHOULD THE SOVIET UNION NOT AGREE TO THIS ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL, DEPLOYMENT OF ERW WOULD PROCEED.

FOREGOING IS GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR THE MONDAY MEETING. WE WILL WANT YOUR REPORT AND SUGGESTIONS ASAP ON MONDAY SO WE CAN WORK OUT GUIDANCE AND TACTICS WITH LUNS AND OTHERS FOR WEDNESDAY.

4. FOR LONDON: PLEASE INFORM FCO OF SECRETARY'S SECRET

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MESSAGE TO GENSCHER, AS WELL AS OUR THOUGHT THAT WE WOULD NOT PUT TEXTS OF SUMMING UP STATEMENT ON THE TABLE FOR DISCUSSION MONDAY. ALSO TELL FCO OF OUR PLANS FOR COORDINATING WITH PETRIGNANI (PARA 3) AND OF POINTS WE WILL MAKE IN NAC (PARA 5).

FOR USNATO: IN PRESENTING THE ERW QUESTION AT THE MONDAY NAC SESSION, YOU SHOULD COVER FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- THE US HAS WORKED THROUGHOUT THE CONSULTATIONS ON ERW TO ENSURE A RESULT SUPPORTIVE OF ALLIANCE UNITY AND OUR OVERALL DETERRENT POSTURE; WE HAVE NOT WANTED TO ALLOW THE SOVIET UNION TO EXPLOIT THE ISSUE TO CREATE POLITICAL DIFFERENCES WITHIN NATO;

--WE BELIEVE THAT THE THREE-PART STRATEGY WHICH WE PRESENTED AT THE FEBRUARY 24 NAC, OF A US PRODUCTION DECISION, AN ARMS CONTROL LINKAGE, AND DEPLOYMENT IN 18 TO 24 MONTHS SHOULD ARMS CONTROL FAIL, CAN ACCOMPLISH OUR POLITICAL AS WELL AS OUR MILITARY SECURITY OBJECTIVES.

--THE UNITED STATES STRONGLY BELIEVES THAT THE ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE SHOULD LINK NON-DEPLOYMENT OF ERW TO SOVIET NON-DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-20. THE SS-20 REPRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT AND THREATENING MODERNIZATION OF SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR STRIKE CAPABILITY. AN EFFORT TO CONSTRAIN IT OFFERS THE CHANCE TO REDUCE A MAJOR THREAT TO ALLIANCE SECURITY, AND PUTS THE SOVIET UNION ON NOTICE THAT ITS THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ARE LEGITIMATE SUBJECTS OF ARMS CONTROL. IT WOULD BE OF SUFFICIENT IMPORTANCE TO WARRANT NATO'S FOREGOING THE ENHANCEMENT OF THE DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE CAPABILITIES WHICH THE ERW REPRESENT.

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--PROCEDURALLY, WE BELIEVE THAT A SUMMING UP STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOLLOWING THE MARCH 22 NAC WHICH COVERS OUR THREE PART STRATEGY IS THE BARE MINIMUM NECESSARY TO MAKE AN ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL CREDIBLE, TO CONVINCE THE SOVIETS THAT WHAT WE ARE OFFERING IS A SERIOUS SYSTEM IN A MILITARY AND POLITICAL SENSE, WHICH WILL BE DEPLOYED IN EUROPE IN THE EVENT THEY DO NOT RESPOND TO THE ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE.

--WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT ALLIANCE UNITY

BE PRESERVED IN THIS DISCUSSION. WE RECOGNIZE THE VARIETY OF VIEWS WHICH HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED ON ERW AND ON THE THREE-PART STRATEGY, BUT WE WOULD HOPE THAT ALL COULD ACCEPT A SUMMING UP STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL WHICH WOULD TAKE NOTE OF THE US PRODUCTION DECISION, EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR AN ARMS CONTROL LINKAGE TO THE SS-20, AND FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE SYSTEMS IN EUROPE SHOULD THE ARMS CONTROL LINKAGE FAIL.

6. FOR ALL ADDRESSEES: FOLLOWING IS SCENARIO AS NOW ENVISAGED: NAC DISCUSSION ON MONDAY, FOLLOWED BY NAC DISCUSSION ON WEDNESDAY MARCH 22, WHICH WOULD BE CONCLUDED BY LUNS PRIVATE SUMMING-UP. THE US WOULD THEN MAKE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ON THURSDAY MORNING, MARCH 23, AND LUNS WOULD MAKE HIS PUBLIC SUMMING UP STATEMENT LATE ON MARCH 23, AFTER US PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT.
VANCE

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PAGE 01 STATE 070503
ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

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DRAFTED BY:EUR/SOV:ABOHLN:GMH

APPROVED BY:EUR/SOV:MGARRISON

S/S:LFLEISCHER

-----097457 230832Z /13

R 221812Z MAR 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0000

S E C R E T STATE 070503

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 070503 ACTION BONNN USNATO, LONDON
AND INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS MAR 18.

QUOTE: S E C R E T STATE 070503

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SECRET

NNN

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Control Number: n/a
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Draft Date: 18 mar 1978
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Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
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Disposition Approved on Date:
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Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
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Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Review Exemptions: n/a
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Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ERW NAC CONSULTATIONS
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, US, GE, UK, NATO, (GENSCHER, HANS DIETRICH), (VANCE, CYRUS)
To: BONN USNATO MULTIPLE
Type: TE
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Sheryl P. Walter
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